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FORUM

THE FLIGHT CREWAND AUTOMATION
Bernard Antonovich

"Automation is the allocation of functions to machines that would otherwise be allocated to humans" (Funk
et al, 1999). Automation on the flight deck has continued to grow throughout the years, with each new generation of
air transport aircraft containingmore automation than the last. As flight deck automation progresses at an increasingly
rapid rate, the interaction between the pilot and automation will become increasingly more complex. These advances
in automation have helped to greatly improve the utility of aircraft, allowing them to do things once thought
impossible, such as landing in zero-zero conditions, near fill-automated take-of&, and optimizing he1 efficiency.
Flight deck automation has brought improvements to the flight deck, but it has also increased the potential for e m
in the essential interactions between the automated systems and the human flight crew. The main concern regarding
automation on the flight deck is the flight crew losing situational awareness. Other concerns include: loss of manual
skill, overconfidence in automation, and difficulty in predicting and monitoring what the automation is doing or will
do. There exists a real need to eliminate or mitigate these problems, which pose a significant threat to safety.
Automation has helped to make air travel safer and
improvementshave been seen, however as Major Wesley A.
Olson (2001, p. 7) notes, "while the overall rate of aviation
accidents has declined dramatically over the last 30 years,
little improvement has been seen over the last 15 years
despite the continued evolution and improvement of
automated cockpit systems." Automation alone can go only
so far, improving upon the interactions between automation
and the human flight crew is a must for continued
improvements upon safety and utility.
The main concern with regards to automation on
the flight deck is the loss of situational awareness on the
side of the human flight crew. Such a loss of situational
awareness poses a real threat to safety, and there are a
multitude of accident reports that demonstrate the threat. A
number of studies have noted that the human flight crew is
at a greater risk to lose situational awareness as the amount
of automation increases. It has been cited by Mica R.
Endsley (1996, p. 4) that "the increased display complexity
and computerized display format reduces the perceptual
salience of information, even if it is available." The claim is
m e r supported by Olson (2001, p. 13)who stated that "in
the absence of salient indications (i.e., Dashing lights, color
changes, etc.), pilots often do not pay attentionto potentially
relevant information." Thus, the way the information is
presented to the crew and the salience of that information is
a contributing W o r to a loss of situationalawarenesson the
part of the flight crew. Making the information available
does not suffice; the information must utilize salient
indications to draw the attention of the flight crew. Without

doing so the crew is likely to overlook or miss important or
critical information. Further, automation has caused the
flight crew to go h m an active role on the night deck to a
passive role. As such, it has removed the flight crew fiom
the loop, and made them more passive decision makers than
they were prior to these advanced automated systems.
Endsley (1996, p. 3) found that in a study dealing with
automated automobiles, "subjects' situation awareness was
lower under fully automatedand semi-automatedconditions
than under manual performance in an automobilenavigation
task." A similarproblem ariseswith automation on the flight
deck. The study showed how automation can negatively
impact a human operator's situational awareness.
A contributing factor for the loss of situational
awareness due to automation is in the feedback given to the
flight crew, which they would receive normally in aircraft
with little to no automation. The effects of this lack of
feedback traditionally found in aircraft can be seen through
'Yhe development of electronic fly-by wire flight
controls in the F-16 [which] led to problems in
determining airspeed and maintain[ing] proper
flight control, as the vibration information that
usually came through the night stick was suddenly
missing (even though the needed information was
clearly indicated on traditional visual displays)."
(qtd. in Endsley, 1996, p. 4)
Even though the information was present, the lack of the
normal non-flyby wire tactile information led to a loss of
situational awareness among the pilots of the F-16. The
problem has been corrected with the addition of artificial
-
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vibrations on the flight stick, which provide the pilot with
the tactile sensations they would normally feel.
Loss of situational awareness has also been
contributed to information overload and is cited by Olson
(2001, p. 13) as having to do with "automated
systems.. .present[ing] more information than the pilot can
process in the time available." This means that even if the
information is available to the flight crew they may not be
able to pick it out among the overload of information they
are receiving in a limited space of time. The human flight
crew must be able to sort through the various information to
pick out what is relevant and what is not. With an overload
of information, the flight crew is unable to sort through the
information in a timely and efficient manner, leading to
midonned or semi-informed decision making. Allowing
the flight crew easy access to the raw data, which they are
used to seeing on non-automated aircraft, may help to
alleviate this problem of information overload.
Proper crew-machine interaction is essential to
maintaining situational awareness and a safe and efficient
flight. There are, however, components in the automation
that block effective interaction. Johan Rigndr and Sidney
Dekker (2000, p. 2) state that this interaction may be
blocked "because pilots can direct the automation
privately.. .the automation is silent about what it does to the
aircraft, and because interactions with the computers often
occur when there is also a lot of other work to do." Rigndr
and Dekker (2000, p. 2) go on to address the need for a
change in training because the training "leaves few
opportunities for aircrews to learn about the broader and
[sic] more subtle influences of automation.. .and on the need
to coordinate despite of flight deck designs.. .that routinely
conspire against the ability to coordinate." If training were
to effectively allow flight crews to analyze the influences of
automation and the changes in the role of the flight crew,
they may be better prepared to deal with some of the
problems associatedwith automation and maintain a greater
situational awareness throughout the flight.
Along with improving flight crew training mother
concern that has been raised with the increased use of
automation is the potential for a loss of manual skill. A
study concerningthe manual skill between airline pilots who
flew primarily "steam" gauges and those who flew the
automated glass cockpit was conducted to see if automation
caused pilots to lose manual skill. A number of obse~ations
were made: "when given close crossing restrictions, the
steam gauge crews were more adept at the mental math and
usually maneuvered the aircraft in a smoother manner to
make the restriction. On the other hand, the glass cockpit
crews tended to go 'heads down' and tried to solve the
crossingrestriction on the FMS" (Veillette, 2006). When the
flight crew goes heads down, they are unable to fly the
aircraft as effectively, proven fiuther by the fact that "many
of the glass cockpit crews mismanaged their time trying to
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figure out how to insert the crossing restriction in the box,
becoming so absorbed in the process that they'd barely make
the assignment" (Veillette, 2006). The glass cockpit flight
crews have a tendency to go heads down when they get a
change to their clearance instead of flying the aircraft. Not
only does this affect their ability to fly the aircraft if the
automation fails, it also negatively impacts their situational
awareness. By directing attention away fiom the flight and
to the Flight Management System, they are diverting
attention from important information about the flight and
from their objective, whether that is a crossing restriction or
a different instruction given by air traffic control. Not only
may this lead to not meeting the clearance, it can also
compromise safety.
Evidence exists to suggest that as the flight crew
becomes increasingly accustomedto the everyday, repetitive
use of automation, they begin to put increasing confidence
into that automation. The overuse of automation, in tum,
may lead to the flight crew becoming overconfident in the
automation system that their aircraft is equipped with.
According to Ken Funk et a1 (2007), "pilots may become
complacentbecause they are overconfident in and uncritical
of automation, and fail to exercise appropriate vigilance,
sometimes to the extent of abdicating responsibility to it.
This can lead to unsafe conditions." The claim has been
supported by a number of accident and incident
investigations,such as the investigationby the Investigation
Commission of Ministry of Transport in their 1989 report,
where it was cited on page 60 that 'Yhe A320 has new
features which may have inspired some overconfidence in
the mind of the Captain." Here is a prime example how
overconfidence in the capabilities of advanced automated
systems can lead the flight crew into let their guard down
and lose their situationalawareness leading to a compromise
in safety.
In regards to automation and the subsequentloss of
situational awareness in the cockpit, a further concern is in
the flight crew having difficulty predicting what the
automation will do. The reason for difficulty in predicting
what automation will do is due in'part to what form of
feedback the automated system gives to the flight crew. As
stated by Olson (2001, p. 18), "automated systems often
lack the ability to clarify ambiguous or misunderstood
instructions," which can lead to the aircraft and automated
systems not performing the functions the flight crew had
intended the automation to perform, leading the flight crew
to be surprised by the resulting actions taken by the
automated systems. There are a number of reasons why the
flight crew may be surprised by, or unable to predict, the
actions of the automated systems. Inability to predict the
actions, or being surprised by the actions, of the automated
system may be explained by Guy A. Boy and P. Carlo
Cacciabue (1997, p. 4), who stated, "automation was
implemented fkom an engineering perspective rather than
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fiom a human operator perspective." Since automation was
not implemented from a human operator perspective, it
could provide at least a partial explanation as to why the
flight crew is surprised by actions taken by the automation
and at times unable to predict what it will do. Boy goes on
to make an astute observation that "automation should be
driven by actual needs rather than by technological optionsyy
(Boy & Cacciabue, 1997, p. 7). If automation was driven by
needs, it might help to mitigate the loss of situational
awareness, and help the flight crew to better predict what
actionsthe automationwill take. Either way, includingflight
crews in the design of automated systems may help to
reduce these problems.
In conclusion,the need to mitigate or eliminate the
loss of situational awareness that occurs as automation
advances is real. It has been documented that with the everadvancinglevels of automation, flight crews can and do lose
situational awareness, and without hand-flying, pilots will
lose effectiveness when dealing with situations where the
automation has failed. Possible ways to help mitigate or
eliminate this loss of situational awareness include:
introducing automation earlier in training, allowing flight

crews input on the design, functions, and displays of the
automated system, as well as designing automation from a
human perspective as opposed to an engineering one.
Further, allowing the flight crew easy access to the raw data,
which is normally present, may help alleviate the problems
in interaction which face the human flight crew. Utilizing
automation to augment the human flight crew and provide
them with the information and performance they need or
request in a timely, efficient, and presentable manner may
increase their situational awareness by giving them the best
of both worlds. Also, having flight crews routinely and
systematically hand-fly the airad3 will aid in keeping the
crew keen in both the use of automation and in managing
the flight should that automation fail. There are a multitude
of ways to improve on automated systems; these are but a
few potential solutions which can help to improve these
essential systems. Automation is here now, and will remain
here. It has allowed us to gain more utilization of aircraft in
a more efficient manner. As such, improving on the humanmachine interaction and keepingthe flight crew aware of the
situation and in the loop at all times, and making the
automated systems an effective crew partner, is a must.+
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